Indonesian Journal of International Law
Volume 14
Number 1 Regional Integration IV

Article 4

10-31-2016

TRANSFER PRICING: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS WITHIN
THE ASEAN REGIME
Jane Florence

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/ijil

Recommended Citation
Florence, Jane (2016) "TRANSFER PRICING: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS WITHIN THE ASEAN
REGIME," Indonesian Journal of International Law: Vol. 14 : No. 1 , Article 4.
DOI: 10.17304/ijil.vol14.1.677
Available at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/ijil/vol14/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UI Scholars Hub. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indonesian Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UI Scholars Hub.

Promoting regional integration through higher education

TRANSFER PRICING: CHALLENGES AND
SOLUTIONS WITHIN THE ASEAN REGIME
Jane Florence*
Abstract
Transfer pricing has recently gained a prominent highlight in ASEAN countries. Eventhough transfer
pricing policy has already been enacted by most of each ASEAN member states, there still exists
loopholes – especially involving the transactions of cross border transfer prices. This research paper
will discuss and further scrutinize the legal issues constituted by these loopholes, which affect both
member states and Multi National Enterprises (“MNEs”) - particularly those associated with deficit
tax revenue suffered by the member states, as a result of transfer pricing manipulations conducted
by the MNEs. Transfer pricing concealed in the form of crossborder transactions; including but not
limited to acquisitions, joint venture, and supply chains - impedes the movement of trade and capital,
even catalyzes a tax distortion. Aside from ASEAN member states, MNEs are also being put at a
disadvantage – to be subjected to a much greater burden on paying a higher cost of compliance, due
to its responsibility to comply with more than one country’s jurisdiction and to have them imposed
towards a susceptible double taxation.The result of this study encourages and essentially demonstrates
the necessity of ASEAN to leverage a firm legal framework on transfer pricing that emphasizes on the
manifestation of ‘arm’s length principle’ in all ASEAN countries’ jurisdictions.
Keywords: ASEAN, transfer pricing.

I.	 INTRODUCTION
The globalized business world has affected the international regime
in various aspects, mainly in the field of international trade. Nowadays,
had the trade barrier been removed and tarriff been prohibited - the
volumes of international global transfer of goods and services, movement of capitals, also intagible assets and services has been increasing
tremendously. In order to catch up with the global movement, with the
help of rapid and expeditious advances in technology, logistics, and
transportation - has given rise to a large number of Multi National Enterprises (MNEs), having them possess the flexibility to expand their
business by establishing subsidiaries and branches outside the parent’s
company jurisdiction. The existence of such subsidiaries and branches has successfully facilitated the conduct of cross-border intra-group
transactions. Those transactions between such related parties, namely
* Lecturer at Faculty of Law, Universitas Airlangga, Email:jane_tjoa@hotmail.com
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an associated enterprise – enterprise that directly or indirectly control
or being controlled in the management, control or capital,1 in which one
party one-sidedly control the price; either determining the price lower
than the market price and thus, shifting the profit gained to a lower
tax jurisdiction; has caused a dissentment between both the MNEs and
the government’s involved between the transaction, mainly its national
tax authority.2 However, such issues should be addressed not only in a
‘water edge’ isolation3, but towards a broad international context as a
whole. This matter, thus, has become a prominent highlight and been
brought up to be a huge issue to the world of international tax law,
namely transfer pricing. These transfer prices play a huge significant
role for MNEs and tax authoity as they determine the large part in the
income and expenses, and thus taxable profits of those associated enterprises, especially in different tax jurisdiction.4
This paper helps to underline the underlying issues of transfer pricing, experienced and faced by both MNEs and government on the matter
of taxation on the business revenues. First, this paper will discuss about
the transfer pricing conduct from MNEs and government’s perspective
along with the legal loopholes dealt by both MNEs and government.
Then, a brief case study along with the concrete examples of transfer
pricing in the business world are outlined. Further, the rules applied for
transfer pricing, as being practiced by United Nations (UN), Organisation of Economic and Development (OECD) member countries, and
also European Union (EU) will also be reviewed. To conclude this paper, an alternate solution for the transfer pricing issues in ASEAN are
also being discussed.
The legal loopholes and evasion caused by transfer pricing, also the
non-existence of such binding regulations on the transfer pricing has
piqued the interest of the author to conduct further research on this matter – also believes this paper would become a legal problem solver to
the problems or loopholes which may arise in the near future and may
benefit the international community as a whole.
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines article 9 subparagraphs 1a and 1b
Lorraine Eden, ‘Taxes, Transfer Pricing, and MNEs’, Oxford University Press,
2001. P.593; Raymond Vernon, ‘Multinational Corporations: Political Economy of
Foreign Direct Investment, Lexington Books, 1985.
3
Eden, p. 614
4
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Preface, p. 21
1
2
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II.	 GROUNDS OF TRANSFER PRICING CONDUCT: IN A NUTSHELL
As stated above, while MNEs establish their subsidiaries and
branches outside their parents’ company jurisdiction, it accommodates
their needs to move their assets while also to conduct several transactions, mainly from the MNE’s parent company to its subsidiary
- so called an intrafirm transaction. Those intrafirm transactions, are
charged on whether they are following the market prices, or reaching a
price consensus of their own, which are usually cost based - neglecting
the market value.5 In such situation, it become\s necessary for MNEs
to determine the price among themselves, so called a ‘transfer price’.
Transfer prices on such transactions are usually decided from both market and group driven forces which may be differ from the open market
conditions operating between the independent entities. Therefore, such
transactions are not only controlled by market forces, however, also by
the driven forces of the common interest of the related parties, such as
associated enterprises which form a part of MNE group. To sum up,
there are both internal and external grounds and reasons for on the set
up of transfer pricing within the intragroup trade in goods, service, and
intangibles assets. Followings are the MNEs and tax authority’s view
on transfer pricing.
III.	MNES’ MOTIVATIONS FOR TRANSFER PRICING
First, the nature of MNEs is an integrated business group which
consist of associated affiliates in other countries, under common control, with common goals, and sharing a common pool of resources.6
Theoretically, MNEs are only subjected to domestic law of the different
states in which they operate in7, but during transactions, MNEs must
comply with the different from country to country’s laws & regulations
and administrative requirements.Many foreign affiliates of MNE are
run as the profit centres, which the income of the top strata of the MNEs
United Nations Tax’s Committee Working Draft on Transfer Pricing, 6th July 2011;
Roger Y. W. Tang 1997, Intrafirm Trade and Global Transfer Pricing Regulation,
Wesport, Quorum Books.
6
Eden, op cit no. 1, p. 596
7
M. Sonarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Third Edition), 2010
5
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depend on their affiliates’ profit.8 In this case, it is internally driven that
the setting of transfer price within the intra-group transactions is to increase the overall efficiency within the firm and monitor the performance of one’s entity within the MNEs group, especially on determining the profitability and income of entities involved in the transactions.
Externally, MNEs’ main purpose on conducting transfer pricing is to
optimize the tax arrangement9.and minimize the taxes paid. By conducting transfer pricing, MNE as a whole, paid a lower tax rate due to
the profit shifting in the lower tax jurisdiction and consequently, having
the tax liability of the relevant company distorted in consequent.10 Also,
the profit gained by MNE is much higher as the transfer price is depending on the price at which the intrafirm transaction takes place. However,
still, they are amounted to double taxation, in which they are obliged
to pay corporate income taxes for both domestic and foreign source income as they conduct a transfer pricing on the cross-border transaction.
IV.	TAX AUTHORITIES/GOVERNMENT’S VIEW ON TRANSFER PRICING
Unlike MNEs who view transfer pricing as a media to internally
monitor their management, meanwhile paying a reduced tax obligations to the whole of MNEs group, tax authority – in contrast, are only
interested in the revenue gained by MNE’s local entity. Thus, the tax
authority of the involved government has the right to tax the MNE’s
income within their jurisdiction.11 However, Tax authority sees transfer
pricing to be unpleasant since the government may lose their fair share
of tax revenue. This is inevitably due to MNEs are paying less than they
should be as their supposedly taxable revenue is being disproportionately allocated to the countries with lower tax jurisdiction – in which at
Eden, loc cit no. 3, p. 597
Ernst & Young Report on Transfer Pricing, 2013
10
Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration, 2012, Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, p. 7 (‘OECD Transfer Pricing and
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration’)
11
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, para 5‐ 12; Wolfgang Schön, “International Tax Coordination for a Second‐
Best World (Part III)”, 2 World Tax Journal (2010), p.227 – 261;
8
9
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the end, MNE as a whole, pay less tax than they are supposed to.
V.	 PROBLEMS GENERATED FROM TRANSFER PRICING MANIPULATION
The transfer pricing itself, is not illegal dan does not bring forth a tax
avoidance. Only when the price set is not in accordance with international applicable norms or domestic law – so called a ‘transfer mispricing’, an issue of tax evasion and profit shifting may arise. In narrower
aspect of tax administration, the problems on policy and practical level
may arise. At the policy level, governments can exercise their rights
to tax the profits of taxpayer based upon the income generated within
their territory. In practical level, it is difficult for tax administration to
obtain the detailed and pertinent data from the transactions conducted
by MNEs located outside their jurisdiction.12
Although according to the abovementioned explanations transfer
pricing seem innocuous, transfer pricing is bound to shape the tax base
of the countries involved in the crossborder transaction, involving the
MNEs and tax authorities. Transfer pricing is usually conducted and
manipulated through moving the deductible expenses to the high taxes
jurisdiction and shifting the revenues to the tax haven countries. Hence,
without any consistent rules and administration, MNEs might be provided with an incentive to evade taxation through transfer pricing manipulation, which is an over or under-invoicing of related party transactions in order to avoid government regulations13; and yet – the world
of international tax is left to deal with the upcoming legal loopholes,
mainly concerning the jurisdictional matters, custom valuation, and allocation of profit.
A. JURISDICTIONAL MATTERS
Theoretically, MNEs are only subjected to domestic law of the different states in which they operate in14, but during transactions, MNEs
must comply with the different from country to country’s laws & regu12
13
14

OECD
Lorraine Eden, 594
M. Sonarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Third Edition), 2010
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lations and administrative requirements. Differing requirements lead to
the greater burden on MNE, resulting in higher cost of compliance than
for a similar enterprise operating solely within the single tax jurisdictions.15 On the other hand, as MNEs are exposed to higher cost compliance to comply with more than one tax jurisdiction, the tax authority
is also exposed to a similar degreee of problem due to the adjustments
made to the transfer price in one tax jurisdiction that immediately affect
the other corresponding jurisdiction.
B. DOUBLE TAXATION
Double taxation arises when two enterprises, as residents in different states, are assessed tax on the same profit or income without relief
provided by either state for tax imposed by the other. The double taxation may be a result of non-arm’s length transactions. The profits of one
enterprise are adjusted upwards (mainly due to underpricing of sales
and overpricing of transactions), increasing the tax charged on that enterprise in one state - known as a primary transfer pricing adjustment,
without a corresponding reduction in tax payable of the associated enterprise in the other state.16 However, problems arise if the other governments try to reconcile their rights to tax the income within their territory
as a result of such cross-border transaction and thus, having one transaction to be taxed by more than one country’s jurisdiction.This leaves
the question on who has the right to tax the MNEs’ income, given both
governments have the same rights and which tax court shall continue
on with the proceedings in case of dispute. Those issues arise due to
MNEs being able to avoid the national reach of government regulations
on transfer pricing – engaging in practice and being equipped with tools
in order to reduce their overall taxable profit.
C. ALLOCATION
In most jurisdictions, the tax authority bears the burden of proof
– requiring them to establish a prima facie evidence, showing that the
MNE’s pricing is inconsistent with the arms’ length principle. From
MNE’s perspective, still, these resources shall be allocated where they
15
16
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offer an overall advantage for MNE as a while, thus having MNEs motivated to shift their profits into countries with lower tax jurisdiction.
Those low tax jurisdictions (i.e tax havens) providee an intriguing offer for MNEs meanwhile creating tax competition between the nation
states.
However, national trade and tax barriers impede such allocation and
also raise the transactional and compliance cost for MNEs. It is also to
be noted, even though common resources are a source of competitive
advantage for members of the MNE, such resources are interdependent
and thus, making it difficult to disentangle the MNE’s global income
for tax purpose.
D. VALUATION (CUSTOM VALUATION)
In practice, MNEs are unconsciously provided with a tool to utilize the intragroup transfer prices for custom purposes. The most significant problems arising from this aspects are having to demonstrate
the intercompany transfer prices to be an acceptable custom value and
properly account for retroactive transfer pricing adjustment to value for
customs purpose.17 When goods are sold between related parties, the
taxable pricing is also used for custom valuation purpose. While transfer pricing is mainly done by underpricing the intra-company sales and
overpricing company purchase, the underinvoicing of intragroup sales
is the main tool to reduce the tax cost, there cause no definite value of
such goods upon the taxable profit.
VI.	ARMS’ LENGTH PRINCIPLE ON TRANSFER PRICING PURPOSE
Due to the aforementioned problems concerning transfer pricing,
government nowadays are facing challenges on protecting their tax jurisdiction while not creating double taxation or uncertainties that would
affect their foreign investment and movement of goods and service.
Thus, the adoption of transfer pricing framework embodying the arms’
The Intersection of Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation: Challenges (and opportunities) for Multinational Enterprises, Michael E. Murphy and Holly E, Max
Planck Encyclopediaea of Public International Law, 2009, p. 149
17
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length principle will be the solution to achive such dual objectives.
A. THE ARMS’ LENGTH STANDARD
Where transactions in goods and services move between associated
enterprises across country borders it is necessary for companies to establish transfer prices with respect to those transactions. However, to
comply with the prevailing transfer pricing regulations, those prices on
such transactions must be made on an arms’ length basis.
Under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, arms’
length is defined as a condition made or imposed in the use or transfer
of intangibles between two associated enterprises differ from those that
would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits that
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises,
but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. In practical
approach, an entity would only acquire the goods or services from the
associated enterprises with the purchase price equal to or below than
the ones offered by the unrelated parties/suppliers. Conversely, the selling price to the associated enterprises shall be equal to or higher than
the price paid by the unrelated parties/purchasers. Prices on this matter
shall gravitate towards the ‘arms’ length principle’ – in which this principle requires two related parties to determine their transfer prices for
an intra-group transaction in which two unrelated parties would have
agreed with when those unrelated parties engage in similar transaction.
It will then, to be generally recognized as prices on which two unrelated
parties would agree to a transaction after bargaining in a competitive
market.
Such principle set forth within the transfer pricing regulation as in
accordance with OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines might bring forth
several tools for the government to face the transfer pricing challenges
head on:18
1. Set up the boundaries while providing governments with tools they
need to fight on the transfer pricing issue conducted by the MNEs
OECD – Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Transfer Pricing Legislation – A
Suggested Approach, June 2011, p. 2
18
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2. Provide MNE with certainty of treatment in such tax jurisdiction
3. Reduce the double taxation
4. Provide a level playing field between the government (as a result of
double taxation), thus less likely to hamper the international trade
and investment
B. TRANSFER PRICING OF THE INTANGIBLES
In the practical approach, transfer pricing concealed in the crossborder transactions often constitutes a transfer price on the intangibles.
What constitues as an intangible is something which is not a physical
asset or a financial asset, and which is capable of being owned or controlled for use in commercial activities, and whose use or transfer would
be compensated had it occurred in a transaction between independent
parties in comparable circumstances.19 Intangibles itself, by OECD, is
being limited to commercial intangibles – intangible property associated with commercial activities (e.g production of a good or provision of
service, or even a business asset transferred to customers or used within
the business operation). The term intangible property ecompasses the
rights to use industrial assets such as patents, trademarks, designs, or
models, even know-how, and trade secrets.20
There are two classified types of intangibles:
1. Trade Intangibles (e.g patents, know-how, and technology intangibles created through investments in research and development)
2. Marketing Intangibles (e.g trademark, trade names)
Previously, the arms’ length guidance and transfer pricing method
shall are generally used to determine the pricing for the tangible property. However, as stipulated in the Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects
of Intangibles, it might be difficult to apply in the case of transactions
involving intangible property due to the complicated search for comparables and the uncertain values at times of transaction.21 Therefore,
in the amendments of the guidance further elaborate that in order to
determine the arms’ length condition on the transfer of intangibles, it is
19
20
21

Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, 2014, p. 31
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, p. 191
Ibid, p. 195
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important to take these followings into account22:
1. Identification of specific intangibles
2. Legal ownership of intangiblesIdentifying the legal owner of intangibles based on the terms and conditions of legal arrangements: registrations, licence agreements, other relevant agreements. Then, the
consistency between the conduct of the parties and the terms of the
relevant legal arrangements regarding intangible ownership will be
examined with a thorough functional analyses.
3. Contributions MNE group to their development and enhancementIdentifying the parties performing functions through assets used and
risks assumed related to developing, enhancing, maintaining, protecting, and exploiting the intangibles by means of the functional
analyses.
4. Nature of controlled transactions involving such intangiblesIdentifying the controlled transactions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles
in light of the legal ownership of the intangibles under relevant registrations and contracts, and the conduct of the parties, including
their relevant contributions of functions, assets, risks and other factors.
5. Remuneration value paid between independent parties involving intangibles (optional)The compensation that must be paid to members
of the MNE group that contribute to the development, enhancement,
maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles is generally
determined on an ex ante basis (anticipated). However, the allocation of ex post (actual) remuneration will depend on the facts and
circumstances of the case.
a. Who owns the intangibles?
The question on who owns the intangibles has been ringing through
the practical approach since the old times. The ownership can be categorized to 2 aspects: legal and economic ownership. The legal ownership is the one that needs to be taken into account, as they can maximize
their possession on the ownership to manipulate the transfer between
legal entity. Often, the owner splits their economic and legal ownership
22

Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, 2014, p. 41
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so they can take the benefits on their commercial and tax interest to its
maximum.
However, the issues will arise if there are 2 or more different entities
owning the legal or economic ownership – how to split profit among
those entities claiming on having the legal or economic ownership respectively.
In this case, in accordance with the OECD Guidelines on Transfer Pricing, the legal owner shall take on the profits. If no legal owner
of the intangible is identified, the entity – based on facts and circumstances, controls decisions concerning the exploitation of such specific
intangible and has the practical capacity to restrict others from using
the intangible shall be consider as the legal owner of such intangibles.23
However, for transfer pricing purposes, for the legal owner to retain the
derived returns from intangible exploitation – the owner shall perform
their function, use the relevant assets, assumes no relevant risks regarding the development of intangible.
b. Determining the Transfer Prices of Intangibles (Case, Veritas
n GE) Identification of legal ownership, combined with the identification and compensation of relevant functions performed, assets used,
and risks assumed by all contributing members, provides the analytical
framework for identifying arm’s length prices and other conditions for
transactions involving intangibles. Such analyses shall consider all of
the relevant facts and circumstances present in a particular case and
price determinations must reflect the realistic alternatives of the relevant group member, including the functions performed, assets used,
and assumed risks.
C. ACCEPTABLE METHOD OF TRANSFER PRICING
For 20s years, there has been a growing uniformity in the acceptable
transfer pricing methods applied by the tax authorities in developed
and emerging market economy. However, transfer pricing is a matter
of facts and status quo, thus, each countries may have different method used by their tax authorities. Followings are the acceptable transfer
23

Op cit, p. 43
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pricing method used and applied by most countries across the globe.
1. Transactional Methods
Transaction-based method is used to calculate the transfer prices on
the sales of tangible property (goods).
a. Product Comparable
Within the product comparable, a Comparable Uncontrolled Price
(CUP) is often used. To calculate the transfer prices under the CUP,
the price of transaction between MNE and the unrelated parties for the
same product under the same circumstances are taken into account.
Also, they shall consider the characteristic of the product, market location, trade level of the firms, and risk involved.24
b. Functional Comparable (Gross-margin Method)
The functional comparable method is an alternate when a product
comparable is not available. This method concerns about the one side
and narrower approach of the transaction, either the manufacturer or
distributor and to calculate the price using functional approach. Followings are the two fuctional comparable method (and also considered as
gross-margin methods) used to determine the transfer prices.
i. Resale Price Method (RPM)
Under the RPM, the tax authority’s concerns are for the firms at
the similar trade levels that perform similar distribution fuctions,
assuming that similar margins on sales are earned for similar
function. Given a large number of distributors, to calculate an
average over those unrelated firms can be a comparison for the
margin that the distribution affiliate will gain in an arms’ length
transaction (also known as the gross profit margin, since it is
derived by the gross margins earned by the comparable distributors engaged in the comparable functions). The formula to determine the transfer price is the overall retail price (price sold to
the consumer) substracted by the abovementioned margins. This
method ensures that the buyer receives an arms’ length return
consistent with those earned by similar firms in a similar transaction.
However, as RPM method is only one-sided, this method cannot
24

71
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precisely calculate whether the manufacturer’s profit is consistent with the margins earned by the other manufacturers. Under
this method, once the distributor’s margin has been determined,
all the excess profit on the transaction is automatically assigned
to the manufacturers. RPM is best used when the distributors
add relatively little value to the product, making the value of its
function easier to eastimate and having intangibles less likely to
be undervalued.
ii. Cost + Method
Cost + method calculates that the transfer price can be determined when the gross markup (assuming that the percentae
markups over cost that would be earned by other arms’ length
manufacturers would be roughly the same) charged by the unrelated firms is added to the standard cost of the related party.
Thus, this method is also a one-sided method, like RPM. As a
one-sided method, C+ only concerns about the profit markup
of the seller and insists that the other seller should earn only
what arms’ length sellers would earn in a similar circumstances.
This method immediately allocates the profit to the distributor,
implicitly assuming the supplier is the manufacturers and thus,
working best when the producer is simple manufacturer without complicated activities, having the cost and return to be more
easily estimated.25
2. Profit-based method
Previous product comparable methods have proven themselves durable to withstand transfer pricing currents. However, product comparable still could not tackle the remaining problems of the lack of arms’
length comparables, making CUP, RPM, and C+ difficult to use in practical approach, especially in the case of intangibles. This is due to the
non-existent external market prices. To deal with this problem, transfers
of intangibles shall be priced commensurate with those intangibles income (CWI Standard). In this CWI standard, the functional analysis and
contemporary documentation of transfer pricing policies are required.
Followings are the two profit-based methods added to complement the
transaction comparable method.
25

Eden, p. 607
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a. Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM)
TNMM is the method commonly used fot justifying the transfer
pricing of the company. TNMM method compares the net profit margin
earned by the arms’ length party with the non-arms’ length one s and
use those net margin to go trace back the transfer price. TNMM searches for the comparable transactions and moves up for the other transactions for which datas can be found. In addition, a functional analysis of
both the associated enterprise and the independent enterprise is required
to determine if the transactions are comparable. It might of course be
possible to adjust results for minor functional differences, provided that
there is sufficient comparability to begin with, The standard of comparability for application of TNMM is no less than that for the application
of any other transfer pricing method.26
b. Comparable profits method (CPM)
This CPM Method is a profit-based method, where the industry average net profit margin earned by comparable firms is used to back into
the transfer price. To perform CPM analysis, the tested party’s (party
whose operating profit attributable to the transactions require the fewest
and more reliable adjustment) results are compared to those of comparable parties (unrelated firms engaged in the same business segment
with their balance sheet adjusted for differences).27
To determine whether the price falls within the arms’ length range,
a net profit margin (derived from the profit level indicator – return on
assets and sales) of the tested party is to be compared with the interquartile range of the comparable parties, having those margin shall fall
inside the interquartile range. If the company’s net profit margin falls
outside the range, the tax authority will set the margin at the median
range and solves backwards to determine the transfer price. The remaining profit of the transaction is then is assigned to the comparable
parties, making the CPM a one-sided method as it focuses only the net
[…] Transfer Pricing Methodologies: OCED guidelines: Transactional net margin
method available at, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/intm421080.htm,
accessed 3 September 2015
27
Transfer Pricing Rules and Compliance Handbook, 2006, Marc. M Levey, Steven
C Wrappe, Kluwer Publishers.
26
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margins of the tested company.28
VII.SOLUTION: CREATING A REGIONAL TRANSFER PRICING REGIME
Transfer pricing issue on cross-border transaction, especially within
the ASEAN Regime, has become difficult to deal with as they involve
more than one tax jurisdiction. Consequently, any adjustment to the
transfer price in one tax jurisdiction immediately affect the other corresponding jurisdiction. Problems arise if, the corresponding jurisdiction
does not agree with such adjustment being made – they will also tax
the MNE, thus amounting to a double taxation for a similar transaction.
Thus, to overcome the issues of double taxation, a regional transfer
pricing regime is required to monitor the flow and tackle upcoming issues of cross-border transaction in ASEAN.
Regional regimes are sets of functional and behavioral relationships
among national governments that has been established in response to
particular issues that has risen up to outside one country’s jurisdiction
– in this case, a transfer pricing. For example, in the situations when
there are no definite legal framework establishing the transfer pricing
policy within such regional, there will be incentives for governments or
MNE to behave opportunistically and thus, setting up a regional regime
will enhance the global welfare by providing rules of behavior, source
of information, legal certainty, and formalizing the dispute settlement
mechanisms; as it embodies principles, norms, rules, and procedures.
Hence, is needed to manage interdependencies among nations.29
A. TRANSFER PRICING AS STIPULATED UNDER THE REGIME
OF EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
Generally, the EU could act as a pattern for ASEAN, primarily on
the expected ASEAN Economic Community in 2015. While EU countries have already started to have themselves assembled into a regional
block with internal market boundary by introducing the freedoms for
Eden, p. 608
Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’ in Stephen Krasner, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983
28
29
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goods, service, and capital. These freedoms have impacted the member ccountries of EU towards a tremendeous economic growth in all
regions, despite their economic segregration.30
1. EU Arbitration Convention
In the transfer pricing section, to resolve disputes on transfer pricing which
leads to double taxation, in 1990, EU Tax Committee established a legal framework to tackle such upward adjustment of profits
of an enterprise of one member states – The EU Arbitration Convention
(“Convention”). This Convention possesses a binding nature towards
all the contracting states on the
goal of eliminating double taxation. As a result, this convention has improved the climate of crossborder transaction within the EU internal market.
EU Arbitration Convention provides that transactions between affiliated companies should be in accordance with the arms’ length standard. Consequently, the tax authorities of the Member States can adjust
the profit made from the transactions when it is not at arms’ length. Affiliated companies are to be assumed as if they are wholly independent
from each other.
EU Arbitration Convention also offers a solution to eliminate the
classical problems of transfer pricing – double taxation problems. According to the EU Arbitration Convention, one of the parties can request
a mutual agreement procedure with the tax authorities of the Member
States if an upward adjustment of profit is being made by an enterprise
of the Member States.31 Both Member States need to come up with a
mutual agreement within two years or else an Advisory Commission
will be established, as stipulated under article 11 of the Convention.
The Advisory Commission will deliver its opinion within six months.
After this the Member States can come to a mutual agreement which is
different from the opinion, but they have to do this within six months. If
they don’t mutual agree within six months, the opinion of the Advisory
Commission is binding. In accordance with the provisions set out in the
Convention, double taxation of profits shall be regarded as eliminated
if either the profits are included in the computation of taxable profits
Asean Tax Guide, KPMG Asia Pacific Tax Centre, November 2013,
Article 5 of EU Arbitration Convention; Implications of the Arbitration Convention, 2006, Andreas Bernath, Jonkoping University
30
31
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in one State only or the tax chargeable on those profits in one State is
reduced by an amount equal to the tax chargeable on them in the other.32
2. EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum
While there is a binding convention, there shall be a jointly authority
established in order to execute the provisions set out in the Convention.
In 2002, the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (“JTPF”) – comprised of
EU member states and business representative (transfer pricing advisors and multinational’s tax expert), was established with the goal of
eliminating transfer mispricing throughout the EU.33
The JTPF examined procedural issues related to the improvement of
the practical functioning of the Convention. This included procedures
to be followed during the interim period when not all Member States
had ratified the Prolongation Protocol, the starting point of the three
year deadline for presentation of a case, the starting point of the two
year mutual agreement procedure and proceedings during it, the proceedings during the arbitration phase and the interaction of procedures
under the Convention with administrative and judicial appeals. The
JTPF concluded that the optimal way to improve the practical functioning of the Convention and to deal with the various issues of it and the
recommendations for those issues, was to propose a Code of Conduct
with rules for the effective implementation of the Convention.34
JTPF also examined existing rules in Member States for suspension
of tax collection during administrative and judicial appeals. It came to
the conclusion that in almost all countries this is regulated for domestic
procedures at legal level. However, for crossborder dispute resolution
these regulations only exist in few countries although a significant number of tax administrations could on a discretionary basis suspend the
tax collection in order to avoid double payment, even if such specific
regulations do not exist. The absence of rules enabling the suspension
Article 14 of EU Arbitration Convention
[…], Taxation Customs Index, available at, http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_
customs/taxation/company_tax/transfer_pricing/forum/index_en.htm, .accessed 5th
September 2015
34
Report of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, Report on the activities of the EU
Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the field of business taxation October 2002 – December 2003, p. 5-6
32
33
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of tax collection during cross-border dispute resolution, at least to the
same extent as for domestic litigation creates an additional financial
burden for the enterprises wishing to apply international double taxation resolution. Therefore, the code provides that Member States are
recommended to take all necessary steps to ensure that the suspension
of tax collection is obtainable for enterprises during the procedures of
the Arbitration Convention in the same way as it would be for domestic
appeals
B. TRANSFER PRICING: HOW SHOULD IT BE GOVERNED
WITHIN THE ASEAN REGIME?
With the implementation of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)
in December 2015, ASEAN is heading down the path to achieve a fully
integrated regional regime of economy. AEC provides the opportunity
to smoothen business operations to take advantages on the new internal
market within the ASEAN members. The opportunities pivot on the
actions of the government – ensure the legislation and the general corporate commercial climate is compatible with the expected affluence of
investment and trade in ASEAN. The pleasant commercial environment
has been catalysed by the decreased corporate tax rates, witholding tax
rates, and custom tarrifs; to streamline the movement of goods and capital and thus, reducing the tax costs and inputs of taxpayers. Though
each member states have reduced their tax costs and inputs of taxpayers, the tax rates between the ASEAN member countries still remain inconsistent – they have not been harmonized. This would become a hindrance in the upcoming 2015 AEC with a more mobile market where it
is easier for goods, services, and capital to move across each countries’
borders – making a profit shifting by MNEs to the countries with a
lower corporate income tax inevitable.

‘
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Countries
Brunei
Darussalam

Cambodia

Indonesia
Laos

Malaysia1

Myanmar

Phillippines2

Transfer Pricing
Regime
Yes.

National Legislation on TP
There is no formal legislation on Transfer Pricing.
Any intragroup cross-border transactions between the
residents and foreign entities has to be conducted within the
arm-length reach.

No. It is only generally
No specific national legislation on Transfer Pricing.
accepted that any
The tax authority has the rights to authorize and reintragroup cross-border
determine the related party transactions in order to impose
transaction has to be
pricing that arms’ length parties would have contracted for in
within the arm-length
the transactions.
reach.
Directorate General of Tax Regulation No. 32/PJ/2011
The transfer pricing regime is based on OECD Guidelines.
Yes
Here, Directorate General of Tax (DGT) has the extended
authorization from all domestics to cross-border transaction.
No
No national legislation concerning Transfer Pricing
Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules 2012 (P.U. [A] 132)
The transfer pricing and advanced pricing agreement rules
were issued in May 2012, but have a retroactive effective
date of 1 January 2009. The transfer pricing rules make
it mandatory for taxpayers to prepare contemporaneous
transfer pricing documentation for their related party
transactions.
The 2012 Malaysian transfer pricing guidelines are largely
Yes
based on the governing standard for transfer pricing, which
is the arm’s length principle as established in the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD Guidelines).
The IRB accepts CUP, Resale Price, Cost Plus, Profit Split
and TNMM. However, the Malaysian transfer pricing rules
state that the traditional methods are preferred over the
profit methods and advise that the profit methods should
only be used when the traditional methods cannot be
reliably applied or cannot be applied at all.
No
No formal national legislation concerning Transfer Pricing
Revenue Regulations 2-2013, dated 23 January 2013
The regulations mainly follow the provisions stipulated
under OECD Guidelines.
The tax authority has the power to allocate income between
Yes
the related parties to prevent the tax evasion and transfer
mispricing. The tax authority is using the arms’-length
principle on evaluating the cross-border transaction.
The BIR accepts CUP, Resale Price, Cost Plus, Profit Split
and TNMM.
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Singapore3

Yes

Thailand4

Yes

Vietnam5

Yes

Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2006, dated 23 February 2006 –
issued by Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore
The legislation strongly follows the OECD Guidelines.
Singapore’s tax authority is endorsing the arms’-length
principle on conducting the review on transfer pricing.
IRAS does not have a specific preference for any of the
5 methods outlined in the OECD guidelines, method
that produces the most reliable results shall be selected.
However, IRAS tends to endorse comparable uncontrolled
price for the loan transactions.
Departmental Instruction no. Paw 113/2545 (DIP 113),
dated 16 May 2002
It follows the OECD Guidelines on TP.
The Thai Revenue Departmenr (TRD), by default, accepts
TNMM, although they would also accept CUP, Resale Price,
Cost + and other commercially used methods, such as the
Profit Split, as specified in the OECD Guidelines
General Department of Taxation, Circular 66/2010/TT/BTC
jo Decision No. 1250/QD-BTC
The tax authorities has the authority to adjust the
transfer price with respect to non arms’ length related
party transactions and taxpayer to comply with the TP
requirement.
The regulations are generally based on the OECD
Guidelines.
Circular 66 permits the use of the following methods:
CUP, Resale Price, Cost Plus, TNMM, and Profit Split.
Taxpayers must use the most appropriate method under
the regulations. There is no hierarchy among the methods,
although recent practice shows that the Vietnam tax
authority has a growing preference for the CUP method.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Having seen the varied income tax rates and numerous transfer pricing regulation in each ASEAN Member states in which such situation
may offer the increased risk of setting up a non arms’ length transfer price and profit shifting –the author suggests it is advisible to create a regional transfer pricing regime within the ASEAN jurisdiction.
In a nutshell, the transfer pricing regulations shall govern the norms,
standard, and transfer pricing policies in practical business approach
while emphasizing that the transactions between affiliated companies
should be in accordance with the arms’ length standard. This regulation
may also adopt acceptable transfer pricing methods as set out in OECD
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Guidelines on Transfer Pricing, such as methods under transactional
cost method and profit-based method on determining the transfer prices.
Moreover, deriving from the practice of European Eunion, an affiliated
enterprise shall be considered an independent entity while subsidiaries
still being regarded as parts of MNEs as a whole.
Furthermore, this regulation will provide ways to eliminate the most
classical issue of transfer pricing – double taxation. This regulation will
permit that one of the parties can request a mutual agreement procedure
with the tax authorities of the Member States if an upward adjustment
of profit is being made by an enterprise of the Member States. Also,
double taxation of profits shall be regarded as eliminated if either the
profits are included in the computation of taxable profits in one State
only or the tax chargeable on those profits in one State is reduced by an
amount equal to the tax chargeable on them in the other.
The author believes that by establishing a regional framework on
transfer pricing within the ASEAN Regime, the problems arising from
transfer pricing will be greatly reduced, as such regional framework
will set up the boundaries while providing governments with tools they
need to fight on the transfer pricing issue conducted by the MNEs, provide MNE with certainty of treatment in such tax jurisdiction, and more
importantly - reduce the double taxation. As double taxation and profit
shifting problems will be reduced, the flow of capital, goods, and service will not be anymore hampered by the international tax problems.
(Footnotes)
1 […] 2013 Transfer Pricing Global reference Guide, available at, http://www.
ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/International-Tax/Transfer-Pricing-and-Tax-EffectiveSupply-Chain-Management/2013-Transfer-pricing-global-reference-guide---Malaysia, accessed 5th September 2015
2 […] Philipines Issue Transfer Pricing Regulations, availabe at: http://www.ey.com/
GL/en/Services/Tax/International-Tax/Alert--Philippines-issues-Transfer-PricingRegulations, accessed 6th September 2015
3 […] Singapore Issue transfer Pricing Regulations, available at: http://www.
ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/International-Tax/Alert--Singapore-issues-TransferPricing-Regulations, accessed 6th September 2015
4 […] Transfer Pricing and Tax Effective Supply Chain Management, available at:
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/International-Tax/Transfer-Pricing-and-TaxEffective-Supply-Chain-Management/2013-Transfer-pricing-global-reference-guideVolume 14 Number 1 October 2016
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--Thailand , accessed 6th September 2015
5 […] Vietnam Issue Transfer Pricing Regulations, available at: http://www.hvglaw.
nl/GL/en/Services/Tax/International-Tax/Transfer-Pricing-and-Tax-Effective-Supply-Chain-Management/2013-Transfer-pricing-global-reference-guide---Vietnam,
accessed 6th September 2015.
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